After spending 10 years saying that all professions are similar and can learn from each other, I'm now ready to make a concession: Law firms are different.
The ways of thinking and behaving that help lawyers excel in their profession may be the very things that limit what they can achieve as firms. Management challenges occur not in spite of lawyers' intelligence and training, but because of them.
Among the ways that legal training and practice keep lawyers from effectively functioning in groups are
- problems with trust;
- difficulties with ideology, values, and principles;
- professional detachment;
- and unusual approaches to decision making.
If firms cannot overcome these inherent tendencies, they may not be able to deliver on the goals and strategies they say they pursue.
The problem of trust
Much current practice in firm governance, organisation, and (not least) compensation comes from the fact that partners vigorously defend their rights to autonomy and individualism, well beyond what is common in other professions. There is nothing inherently wrong with that.
However, as major corporations consolidate their work among a smaller number of firms, domestically and internationally, they expect that firms will serve them with effective cross-office and cross-disciplinary teams. Firms are vigorously responding to this with a stampede of lateral hires, mergers, and acquisitions. Their goal is to create big organisations offering many disciplines, locations, and cultures.
The unanswered -- actually, barely asked -- question is whether these firms can shift from a managerial approach, based on partner autonomy, to new approaches that can create a well-coordinated set of team players. Is the tradition of autonomy at the heart of a partner's identity, or can it change?
In addition to fighting vigorously to preserve their autonomy, lawyers are professional sceptics: They are selected, trained, and hired to be pessimistic and to spot flaws. To protect their clients, they place the worst possible construction on the outcome of any idea or proposal, and on the motives, intentions, and likely behaviours of those they are dealing with. As Tony Sacker, a solicitor in the United Kingdom, says: "I am paid to have a nasty, suspicious mind."
Lawyers carry this view into their dealings with their own partners. It is hard to unbundle which is the cause and which is the effect, but the combination of a desire for autonomy and high levels of scepticism make most law firms low-trust environments.
Recently, I was advising a firm on its compensation system. They didn't like my recommendations. Finally, one of the partners said, "Richard, all your recommendations are based on the assumption that we trust each other and trust our executive or compensation committees. We don't. Give us a system that doesn't require us to trust each other!"
A former managing partner with whom I have discussed this says, "It's not that I don't trust my partners. They're good people, mostly. It's that I don't want to have to trust them. Why give up any degree of control over your own affairs if you don't have to?"
Actually, a low-trust environment has plenty of unfortunate consequences -- and they are readily observable in many law firms:
- Initiatives that depend on teamwork and joint efforts will rarely be implemented well, if at all. People may show up to a practice group meeting and help develop a joint plan, but they rarely feel mutually committed to or accountable for the group's decisions. When lawyers cannot depend on their colleagues to live up to commitments made in these meetings, they give themselves permission to have a similar attitude, and the situation spirals downward.
- When a firm's prevailing atmosphere is one of competition, not collaboration, partners rarely make sacrifices for the good of the firm. For example, they will be reluctant to take on managerial roles that might require them to limit their full-time practices, for fear that their partners will not treat them equitably when the time comes for them to re-enter full-time practice.
- There is low tolerance for ceding power or influence to practice group or firm leadership. The result is that even in the largest firms, executive authority can be so severely limited as to be meaningless. Decisions are made slowly, if not avoided altogether.
- Committees proliferate to address all topics, large and small. They are designed not only to ensure extensive participation, but also to put in place checks and balances intended to circumscribe the ability of any individual (or group) to decide anything on behalf of the firm. This may have the virtue of being democratic, but it is a primitive form of democracy that requires everyone to be involved in every decision. It both slows down decision making and unnecessarily distracts from other, more productive tasks.
- There is a drive to seemingly objective formula-based compensation systems. These serve only to entice partners into gaming the system through hoarding work and bickering over origination credits in order to look good in the official statistics. Partners constantly ask, "What's in the compensation formula?" and they do only those things that are. As a result, many behaviours necessary for the firm's success cannot be enforced, because they are not in the formula. Firm leaders have bemoaned this situation for decades, but few have found a way to solve it.
- Most important, absence of trust may be a significant contributing factor to the extremely short-term orientations of many law firms. If partners don't believe the firm will remember or value their contributions to future success, why would they make any investment that they may not ultimately get credit for?
As one of my clients -- a former managing partner at a high-profile firm -- observed about many law firms he knew:
"Most partners were recognised and rewarded for being the smartest person in the class or the most accomplished. They have rarely experienced or understood the power of succeeding as part of a larger group or team. Their focus tends to be selfish and self-serving, even narcissistic. The result is that the firm resources are squandered and poorly used, clients don't get the best lawyers assigned to their files, and firms are less profitable. This selfishness also leads to a short-sighted approach to decision making that inhibits long-range success because investments of time or money that don't yield immediate results are rarely made."
Scepticism about ideology, values, and principles
The single biggest source of trust in an organisation occurs when everyone can be depended upon to act in accordance with a commonly held, strictly observed set of principles. Examples of such principles are "Our clients' interests always come first; if we serve our clients well, our own success will follow" and "We have no room for those who put their personal interests ahead of the interests of the firm and its clients." (Both of these, by the way, are from Goldman Sachs.)
It is important to note that commercial benefits do not come simply from believing in or encouraging these principles but from actually achieving an organisation where partner behaviour is always consistent with them. When this is the case, less time is wasted in internal negotiations and posturing, strategies are implemented, and true teamwork results. Partners allow others to make decisions on their behalf or refer work to each other across the boundaries of practice groups and location because they can be confident that the other person will make decisions using the same values and principles that they would themselves use.
Law firms appear unable to achieve this level of ideological consistency. They will buy into principles -- firms can have very high ideals as long as they remain ideals -- but they have difficulty with the concept of enforcement. Firms are seemingly willing to adopt strategies and statements of values and mission, but are usually unwilling to specify what the penalty would be for non-compliance. Not surprisingly, that rarely results in effective implementation.
There is a reason for this. As a partner in an eminent U.S. firm points out, "Lawyers raised in the common-law tradition are trained to have a deep suspicion of overarching principles. The essence of the common-law approach is that decisions are made incrementally, always leaving open the possibility that the next case could be treated completely differently."
In my consulting work I have repeatedly advocated a system of help and coaching for partners who fail to meet the firm's standards. If coaching fails to bring a partner up to the firm's standards after a fair and reasonable amount of time, the partner is asked to leave. This is, in fact, close to the system that firms employ with respect to partners who fail to hit financial targets such as billable hours.
However, the point I keep trying to make is that if a firm wishes to excel in other areas, such as client service, collaboration, or associate supervision, the same process should apply. The response is predictable. Most law firms say that the idea of tackling a rainmaker on these "soft" issues is unrealistic, idealistic, uncommercial, and suicidal. In vain I point out that these standards are what firms already preach in their client and recruiting brochures and claim as their values.
While a majority of firms will vote to proclaim standards, they will usually not vote to enforce them. Indeed, the signs are that they vigorously prefer the opposite: Law firms have a proliferating plethora of rules, not functioning principles, because they don't or won't trust that their partners will adhere to the values, standards, and principles that they agreed upon. So firms end up with a mishmash of bureaucratic red tape in the hope that mandatory processes will achieve compliance when adherence to common values does not.
Professional detachment
In their legal training, lawyers are encouraged to be dispassionate. They have been schooled to leave their personal feelings at home. One lawyer told a consultant friend of mine that when he hung up his jacket on the back of his door in the morning, with it went his personality, both of which he put on at the end of the day as he left the office.
As many researchers have shown, lawyers score very low in the areas of intimacy skills and sociability. They tend to prefer role-to-role interactions with people, inside and outside the firm, rather than eagerly seeking out person-to-person connections. This doesn't mean they don't like people. It just means that, statistically speaking, lawyers prefer focusing on the job at hand rather than investing in relationships with those they are working with (other partners or associates) or for (clients).
This can have unfortunate, if unintended, consequences. Consider this e-mail, which I recently received from Marein Smits, a Dutch lawyer:
"At your recent seminar you made fun of me because I laughed at the idea of being genuinely interested in the industry and business of the people who are my clients. Rightly so: My laughing was cynical ... The first thing you learn when you become a lawyer is not to care. The legally sound judgment, the intellectual sparkle, that is what counts. The personal, the emotional, what is right: Throw it away, because it will taint your professionalism. 'Do not get involved' is the credo."
A major rainmaker once pointed out to me, "I can't convince my partners that this is all about human beings, that you market most successfully by showing an interest in the client as a person. My partners really don't want to express that level of intimacy with anyone at work." This lack of intimacy affects not only marketing and client relations, but also the way in which partners deal with each other and how firms are managed.
Rather than describing a highly interpersonal approach to coaching and helping each other succeed, the term "management" has come in many firms to mean a cold, detached, analytical approach to business. Financial scorecards are put in place, and everyone is told (implicitly or explicitly), "Here's what you will be measured on; see you at the end of the year!" They are not helped to achieve, merely rewarded if they do, and they live in fear of what might happen if they do not. This can achieve the goal of getting everyone to work harder, but it comes at a significant price in terms of partner morale and cohesion. Help, teamwork, and mutual support are often absent, since they depend on personal interactions. Instead, there is a system of measures and rewards.
While this approach is the one preferred by many partners (and many firms) it inherently limits creation of a strategically responsive organisation. In these days of ever-accelerating partner and associate mobility, a firm tied together only by measures and rewards will be inherently unstable.
There are signs that a few firms are recognising the importance of this issue. Says one managing partner: "The idea has slowly taken hold in our firm that one should deal with people as people, show warmth and empathy, and build personal relationships with others in the firm ... My leadership style has evolved over the years from trying to be comprehensive and logical to relying more on developing personal rapport and trying to motivate people." This insight might be gaining ground. But the behaviour inside many law firms has yet to catch up.
Approaches to decision making
When it comes to discussing their firms' affairs, lawyers have peculiar ways of conducting discussions and arriving (or not arriving) at decisions. The essence of lawyers' training and daily practice is to contest with other lawyers. While winning arguments against non-lawyers (such as consultants like me) is mere sport, winning them against other lawyers is a deadly serious business -- a challenge to their core ability.
In a room full of lawyers, any idea, no matter how brilliant, will be instantly attacked. Lawyers are expert loop-hole finders, trained to find counter-examples of or exceptions to any proposition. Accordingly, within a short time, most ideas, no matter who initiates them, will be destroyed, dismissed, or postponed for future examination.
Frequently, this leads managing partners, committee chairs, and practice group leaders to substantially over-invest in decision making. They want to be armed in advance with a lengthy memo about every decision so they can dump it in the lap of the complainer as part of fending off the attack.
Another common management strategy is to keep all proposals ambiguous, so that there is nothing specific to be attacked. As a result, law firms have a remarkable propensity for half measures, launching poorly specified programs with minimal chances of success. A common law firm dialogue is as follows: Let's have client service teams! (All agree.) What do we mean by such teams? (We don't want to say yet.) What shall their responsibilities be? (That's to be worked out.) What are the obligations of team members to each other? (We'll let them figure it out.) Combine all this with the obligation to resolve issues through committees, and you have a recipe for business constipation.
This is not necessarily a problem for lawyers. My own solicitor pointed out, "You are taught in law school that there are no right answers. We are actively trained to be non-decisive and are comfortable with a lack of closure."
When lawyers reason with each other, the primary objectives are not necessarily logic, consistency, reasonableness, or fairness. In their professional practice, whether in trial or deal-making, many lawyers are more frequently rewarded for persuasiveness, rhetoric, verbal agility, and point scoring. These habits of a professional lifetime readily spill over into internal firm discussions.
Lawyers also have a strange view of the concept of risk. In any other business, an idea that was likely to work much of the time would be eagerly explored. This is not necessarily the case with lawyers. If one partner says, "This works in the vast majority of cases," you can be sure that another will say, "Maybe, but I can construct a hypothetical scenario where it will fail to work. That makes it risky." Probabilities do not seem to influence the discussion, only possibilities. There is no greater condemnation in legal discourse than to describe something as risky. Contracts, deals, and court cases must be bullet-proof, not risky.
In other businesses, innovative thinking and action are considered a primary requirement for success. Companies eagerly search for strategic ideas and initiatives that their competitors have not discovered.
Lawyers are usually different. Presented with a new business idea, the first thing they ask is, "Which other law firms are doing this?" Unless it can be shown that the idea has been implemented by other law firms, lawyers are sceptical about whether the idea applies to their world. If everyone has these problems, they can't be so bad, the thinking goes. As long as we are no worse than anyone else, we don't need to change! It's hardly a recipe for a strategic advantage.
What can be done?
If lawyers deal with each other so poorly, why do they do so well financially? My answer is only partly humourous: The greatest advantage lawyers have is that they compete only with other lawyers. If everyone else does things equally poorly, and clients and recruits find little variation between firms, even the most egregious behaviour will not lead to a competitive disadvantage.
A persuasive case can be made that lawyers will not change, because times are good and partners (and associates, for that matter) earn a lot of money. However, the question always arises as to how the money is being made. Many law firms have discovered that you can truly make a lot of money if you work everybody very, very hard and really slash your costs and don't care about how people -- partners, associates, or staff -- feel about their work lives.
While that's one approach to riches, it can be shown (as in my articles) that it is not the best or most sustainable approach to riches. "Let's succeed by working more hours with ever-decreasing amounts of support" is not the most sophisticated piece of business thinking I have ever heard. The answer, for firms that choose to pursue it, lies not in ever-more-sophisticated (and tough) business management tools, but in a head-on confrontation with the issues of trust, values, interpersonal behaviour, and decision-making logic that I have explored here.
If firms are to deliver on the visions they have set for themselves, they must address such issues as what behaviour partners have a right to expect from each other, what the real minimum standards and values are, and how common values and standards can actually be attained, not just preached.
I have written about these topics extensively before and will not repeat either the arguments or the advice here. (My past writings are available on my website, vistageconsulting.com.) Suffice it to say that unless law firms undergo a cultural revolution, not just minor changes, most will not be able to achieve their ambitions. Dysfunctional behaviour by partners, currently not only tolerated but vigorously celebrated, will prevent firms from functioning as they desire.
There is some hope, because what has been reported here are common tendencies, not iron-clad laws. There are firms that are exceptional, singular counter-examples to the propositions explored here, and they are tackling head-on the core issues of culture, trust, and partner behaviour. On the other hand, many other firms are doing the very things that will prevent them from creating the truly collaborative organisations their lawyers say that they want.
One of the central things we know about trust and collaboration is that they come mostly from repeated interactions between people who have not only a history together, but also the certainty of a future together. Trust comes from relationships and the expectation of continuing relationships. Over time, as they interact with each other, they as partners, practice groups, and offices may actually come to trust each other.
Unfortunately, in many of today's firms that have been cobbled together from lateral hires and newly merged practices, the personal history that forms the basis of trust is often missing, as is the confidence that everyone will be practicing together for a long time. In many firms, even solidly successful partners live in fear that they will be among the next group of partners to be "let go."
In such an environment, the natural evolution of trust may be difficult, if not impossible. Instead, what firms need, literally, is a constitutional convention where their lawyers draft the explicit, basic law that is going to govern their firms -- the precise behaviours, rules, and principles that will determine what partners have a right to expect from each other.
When thought of as aspirations (which is usually the case), firms' values are usually explicitly articulated and remarkably similar. However, if a value is seen as a minimum standard of behaviour that all members agree to live by, then the true values remain ambiguous in most firms and vary immensely among firms.
Firms have historically flourished without constitutions that spell out minimum partner behaviours. For many, profits and revenues keep rising. What then will be the force that might create the need for change? Most likely, it will be client pressure on firms to act as firms -- delivering seamless service, practice areas that have depth (and not just a collection of individualistic stars), and true, cross-boundary teamwork.
Many firms have collections of great lawyers. The time may be coming when clients will expect them to go beyond this and become effective organisations. Without a prior, explicit agreement on minimum standards, and the resolve to enforce them, many law firms will not function well as firms but will remain what they are today: bands of warlords, each with his or her followers, ruling over a group of cowed citizens and acting in temporary alliance -- until a better opportunity comes along.
12 comments:
Richard: with much of your article I agree.
Just a thin line of thought that may be relevant: One ingredient for mastering the challenge of turning several hundred (depending on size of partnership) businesses into one business is leadership.
I just wonder whether the factors you raise don't prohibit the development of competent leaders.
At least as long as the profession and its business entities remain "pure" -- only lawyers are partners and have a real say.
The first solution for this problem has been practiced: bring in an outside non-lawyer to run the place.
But experience seems to suggest that this does not work (as a rule with exceptions); partners get even more internally focused and/ or leave the boat.
Yet, I seem to observe that the majority of lawyers, especially the younger partners, want to break with the history and want to create a common and collaborative business.
Hence is the solution then the one where an outsider creates a law firm from scratch (as a shell) and invites those that play by the rules necessary and in place for creating the "one business"?
Absurd in the past, but in future as well -- with the financing alternatives in place through the Clementi reforms in England & Wales?
Could this be a game changer as then, you pointed it out, lawyers no longer compete with lawyers?
Friedrich
A very interesting piece.
Hard hitting though I think most law firm partners would agree with your analysis.
I wonder if you see a detailed constitution as an alternative to building trust (is trust really necessary so long as behaviours are appropriate) or as a tool to help build trust (by removing opportunities for behaviours that might undermine it).
Friedrich -- I think you have made a number of very important points.
First, to break out of the low-trust cycle would require a leader with a real ideology and the courage to fight for it, but as you say, the system and the culture prevent such a person emerging.
I also agree that a non-lawyer executive is NOT the answer -- the whole point of my analysis is to argue that it is the training and culture of the lawyers that causes the problem, not the individual characteristics of the man or woman in charge (see my earlier blog about "Dangerous Rubbish about Leadership".
I think you are completely correct that significnt change will not come fom within -- innovations in business, we are taught by Clayton Christensen in The Innovator's Dilemma) always come from upstart outsiders or spin-offs.
I absolutely expect that to happen in the practice of law.
I do sense that the level of partner frustration in many firms has hit boiling point, and I think you are hinting at the same thing.
The core issue is the sad fact that so many law firms seem to think that what they have now is inevitable -- and THEY don't lke it.
It's not you or me, Friedrich, taking pot-shots from the sidelines.
THEY hate it, but feel stuck!
Phil, I think that building trust is going to take a lot more than just a constitution, but I also believe that it has to start there.
If we don't know what agreements we have with each other, what we can expect from each other, what the rules are in our society, how can we begin to trust another person?
Coaching, support, concern, assistanace and, yes, ultimately, enforcement will be necessary, but none of these can take place if there are no agreements on what the real rules of mebership are.
Richard,
My observations of law firm governance and leadership are more of a microcosm of yours, viewed through the narrower lens of firms' sales and marketing functions and decisions.
Like you, I scratched my head at the odd combination of undeniable economic success and organisational dysfunction.
I'm convinced that law firms are not inherently unlike other organisations; they're merely less mature organisationally.
While the science of law dates from the Magna Carta, the competitive business of law arguably is only 25 years old, since the Bates decision -- in historical terms, a toddler, perhaps even an infant.
It was only 10-15 years ago that law firms began professionalising the most basic business functions: finance, HR, IT.
That the profession's operational or executive management lags far behind is no surprise, particularly given your astute observations about the control and trust issues in the culture.
I think it's important to look at "leadership" and "management" not as baseline expectations as they have become in most other industries over time, but as new ideas, as innovation.
As Everett M. Rogers argues in "Diffusion of Innovations", (very dense; don't bother unless you're really curious about this stuff) innovations do not sell themselves.
Rather, idea adoption follows a very predictable curve that we have all seen play out:
1) Early Adopters are motivated to try something new, for many reasons;
2) as their success is reported, others adopt the idea, accelerating the adoption rate;
3) at some point, usage reaches a critical mass, making yesterday's innovation today's mainstream.
Systemic change is an effect, not an initiative.
In business, people initially associate out of necessity, usually to pursue a common goal.
When they succeed, they create "operational trust", which emboldens further operational change.
In this context, we're at the Early Adopter stage of many of the management concepts you cite.
We recently developed an innovative architecture to make client teams functional and prepare associates for a productive relationship with the marketplace.
This includes a reward system that aligns all parties' self-interest.
We are encouraged by the number of managing partners who are embracing this approach, have told us that we've "cracked the code", or are currently exploring its feasibility.
We consider that an encouraging start.
We're not going to see precipitous, systemic change in management, trust or collaboration, not because they're lawyers but because that doesn't happen anywhere.
Abso-freaking on point, Richard.
You've managed to pull togtether many of the points that lots of us in various legal consultative roles have been making for years.
In short -- that law firms are, in their current incarnations, simply dysfunctional from a management and standards viewpoint.
I don't know what can be done to really drive change in the industry.
As you say, there is really no alternative to lawyers when it comes to law.
I wonder what a law firm managed by partners all of whom had had good, positive, extenxive experience at major corporations might look like?
I wonder what a law firm managed by lawyers who had been other things before becoming lawyers might look like?
I wonder what a law firm managed by the Borg might look like.
Actually, I don't have to imagine that ;)
Nice piece, Richard.
Really, really nice.
I look forward to reading the full monty.
This just came in by email from Carl A. Singer, Senior Implementation Manager, at Information Builders Consulting --
I enjoyed your insights about lawyers.
My cousin is completing his second year of law school and I see much of what you say reflected in him.
I don't know if it's chicken or egg -- that is did he gravitate towards law because, or has studying law changed him.
This whole thing reminds me of my niece's experience with a megafirm.
After undergrad, she worked for a summer at a large firm for whom her father was a significant client.
At her law school graduation party last summer, in response to my question about what she thought she wanted to do, she said, "I definitely don't want to work for a big firm".
She went on to describe the experience as so disrespectful and inconsiderate that, had she not already been accepted to law school at the time, she would have cancelled her application and chosen a different profession.
She's clerking for a judge right now, but the decision where to practice will return for her in a year or so.
Will law firms be any more attractive then?
We'll see.
Richard, as you well know, your observations are not limited to lawyers.
They really apply to all organisations that employ and are managed by knowledge workers.
Well done.
I received this comment by email --
Richard: I served as chair of an AmLaw 100 firm for more than a decade.
Many of the points made in your article are entirely consistent with my own experience.
When I became chair, my firm was in serious trouble.
It had made imprudent investments, profits had declined significantly, and the firm had suffered a series of partner defections.
To make matters even worse, the firm had borrowed to fund distributions to partners and was in default under a credit agreement.
I was asked by a group of partners whether I would run for the position of firm chair.
I told my partners that I would stand for election and, if elected, would serve only with the understanding that I would treat the chair position as full-time.
I felt that full-time leadership was mandatory if I were to have any chance of success.
I said that I wanted authority to act quickly and decisively, similar to the authority that a corporation vests in a CEO.
I also said I was confident we could save the firm if we all dedicated ourselves to that task.
In essence, I ran on that platform.
And I was elected.
The recovery was very much a team effort, but I'm confident it would not have taken place but for the substantial authority vested in the firm's chair by its partners.
But as the firm grew strong again, it became increasingly clear to me that the firm had been much easier to manage when it was in great difficulty than after it regained financial health.
In the early years, the path was clear -- address overcapacity, reduce unnecessary expenses, close underproductive offices, weed out inappropriate clients, improve quality, strengthen risk management procedures, recruit well, and communicate with everyone all the time about everything.
While I never took advantage of the authority my partners had vested in me, neither did I wonder whether I would have partner support for difficult decisions.
I believe they trusted me to make good decisions, and I trusted them to support me.
But as time passed and the firm became healthier, my job became noticeably more difficult.
Many of the issues that you suggest make law firms difficult to manage -- problems with trust, cultural differences, dysfunctional interpersonal behaviour, and aversion to risk -- came to the forefront.
One of the lessons from my experience is that the degree to which partners cede management authority to their leaders may well be inversely proportional to the firm's current health.
You ask, "Are law firms manageable?"
My answer is, "Yes, when they're in dire straits. At other times, I'm not so sure."
Like you, I believe there is some hope.
I know another AmLaw 100 firm that has a culture I would have given anything to have had at my former firm.
Most of this firm's partners will say "values and culture" when you ask what means most to them about the firm.
Interestingly, this firm has a single-tier partnership.
My sense is that it has suffered relatively less partner and associate turnover than many of its peers.
Trust and collaboration are among the values its partners hold most dear.
Thanks for contributing to a fascinating dialogue on law firm management issues.
I look forward to reading your posts.
Richard: An invaluable piece, and a milestone (IMHO) in the literature of managing law firms.
all the best,
:Bruce
You're on to something here.
Indeed, I would extend the reasoning to include several other elements:
Lawyers value words over numbers.
Business management is all about numbers.
This subject generally makes lawyers feel uncomfortable.
Lawyers are advisors; they believe in laying out endless alternatives and having someone else decide.
Business management requires deciding.
Lawyers believe no risk is too small not to mention or highlight.
Business management is about knowing what to ignore.
These are in addition to your entirely valid point about that lawyers delight in the sophist argument divorced from personality (litigators are usually very nice people outside the courtroom) or equity (they argue the case rather than stepping back for what's fair).
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